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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

ISSUE I:

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT
THERE WAS NO GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT
CONCERNING WHETHER OR NOT PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT
WATTERS WAS AN EMPLOYEE OF DEFENDANTS AND
APPELLEES.

ISSUE II:

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT
THERE WAS NO GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT
CONCERNING MESA VISTA'S LICENSURE.

ISSUE III:

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY
REFUSING TO GRANT PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT'S MOTION
FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT WHICH MOTION IS BASED
UPON PLAINTIFF'S COUNSELS FAILURE TO TIMELY FOLLOW
THE RULES OF PROCEDURE RELATING TO SUMMARY
JUDGMENT MOTIONS.

STANDARD OF REVIEW: See Brief of Appellant at 1-2.
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STATUTES OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THIS

APPEAL

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(b):
"(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to
claim for relief in any pleading, whether a claim,
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall
be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one
is required, except that the following defenses may at
the option of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of
jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue, (4)
insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of service
of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, (7) failure to join an
indispensable party. A motion making any of these
defenses shall be made before pleading if a further
pleading is permitted. No defense or objection is
waived by being joined with one or more other defenses
or objections in a responsive pleading or motion or by
further pleading after the denial of such motion or
objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief
to which the adverse party is not required to serve a
responsive pleading, he may assert at the trial any
defense in law or fact to that claim for relief. If,
on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to
dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim
upon relief can be granted, matters outside the
pleading are presented to and not excluded by the
court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary
judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and
all parties shall be give reasonable opportunity to
present all materials made pertinent to such a motion
by Rule 56."
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(c) and (e):
"(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall
be served at least 10 days before the time fixed for
the hearing. The adverse party prior to the day of
hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment
sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as
a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability
alone although there is a genuine issue as to the
amount of damages.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense
required. Supporting and opposing further affidavits
shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth
such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and hall
3

show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to
testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or
certified copies of all papers or parts thereof
referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto
or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits
to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers
to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a
motion for summary judgment is made and supported as
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest
upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading,
but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he
does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate,
shall be entered against him."
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60(b):
"(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly
discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon
such terms as are just, the court may in the
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal
representative from a final judgment, order, or
proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly
discovered evidence which by due diligence could not
have been discovered in time to move for a new trial
under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore
denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation
or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) when, for
any cause, the summons in any action has not been
personally served upon the defendant as required by
Rule 4(e) and the defendant has failed to appear in
said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment
has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior
judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or
otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that
the judgment should have prospective application; or
(7) any other reason justifying relief from the
operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3),
or (4), not more than 3 months after the judgment,
order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion
under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality
of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does
not limited the power of the court to entertain an
independent action to relieve a party from a judgment,
or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon
the court. The procedure for obtaining any relief from
a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these
rules or by an independent action.
Utah Administrative Code section R432-100-2.201(A) provides
"Licenses Required.

No person or governmental
4

unit acting severally or jointly with any other
personf or governmental unit shall establish,
conduct, or maintain a health facility in this
state without first obtaining a license from
the department•"
Utah Administrative Code section R432-100-2.203(B) provides
that
"Upon verification of compliance with
licensing requirements the Department shall
issue a provisional license."
Finally, Utah Administrative Code section R432-100-2.204(B)
provides
"Non-transferable. The license shall
be issued only to the licensee and for
the premises described in the application
and shall not be assignable or transferable."

5

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

NATURE OF THE CASE,
This case was filed by plaintiff and appellant (hereafter

"APPELLANT") for constructive discharge, wrongful constructive
discharge, breach of employment contract, breach of insurance
contract, wrongful refusal to pay insurance claims, and
conversion.
The defendants and appellees took over the facility after
appellant had quit working.

Appellant has since filed suit

against her employers in an action naming Vali Division of
Wasatch, Inc., appellant's true employer, as a defendant. See
Watters v. Allred, et al. Case No. 930400568.

Appellant has also

named appellee Allred as a defendant in the new suit as an
employee of Vali Division of Wasatch.1
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS.
Appellant filed her original verified complaint on January

14, 1993.2
complaint.3

On July 7, 1993, plaintiff filed an amended
On July 15, 1993, defendants and appellees KAREN

ALLRED, et al., (hereinafter "APPELLEES") filed their motion to
dismiss based upon Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(b)(6). 4
In opposition to defendant's motion to dismiss, appellant filed
an objection and submitted extensive evidentiary materials,
including the declaration of appellant and two (2) other
2

Mesa Vista, Inc. is not named as a defendant in this
action.
2

Record at 10.

3

Record at 41.

4

Record at 68.
6

individuals.5

On September 23, 1993f appellees filed their

Response to Plaintiff's Objection to Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss and Request to Convert to Motion for Summary Judgment
[Rule URCP 12B(b)].6

Appellees also submitted the Declaration of

Karen A. Allred with attached exhibits in support of defendants'
motion for summary judgment.7

On September 30, 1993, appellant's

counsel filed a request for oral argument on defendants' Motion
for Summary Judgment.8

Appellant filed no opposition to

defendants' motion for summary judgment and submitted no
affidavits which were responsive to the factual assertions of
appellees.9
On November 5, 1993, Judge Park entered an order which
stated in relevant part as follows:
"1. Defendants' motion to dismiss, now converted to
motion for summary judgment is set on December 1 4 ,
1993, at 8:15 a.m."10
The November 5, 1993 order also set for hearing appellant's

5

Record at 177.

6

Record at 190.

7

Record at 230.

8

Record at 238. It is important to note that appellant
filed a request for hearing on defendants' motion for
summary judgment on September 30, 1993, yet later, claimed
to have been "some what confused" as to what the nature of
the proceedings was. See Hearing Transcript at 5, line 25
thru 6, line 3.
9

As of this writing, appellant has still not claimed she was
ever employed by appellees. In that appellant was not
employed by appellees, a claim for wrongful discharge will
not lie against appellees.
10

Record at 315. Once again appellant's counsel was
notified of the nature of the proceedings yet feigned
confusion at the hearing.
7

motion to file a second amended complaint.
On December 14, 1993, the hearing on the above matters was
held and the court, after hearing extensive argument from both
parties, granted defendants' motion for summary judgment.

At the

hearing on December 1 4 , 1993, appellant's counsel, Ms. Marti
Jones, informed the court that the motion to file a second
amended complaint had been withdrawn.

In particular, Mr. Jones

stated to the court:
"MS. JONES: Your Honor, that motion has been withdrawn.
It was withdrawn yesterday...
THE COURT:

Have you filed a document?

MS. JONES:
motion.

We filed a notice of withdraw with that

THE COURT:

When did you file that?

MS. JONES:

Yesterday."11

In fact, at the time that Ms. Jones made these statements
they were false and were known by Ms. Jones to be false.

As the

record reflects, the notice of withdrawal of plaintiffs motion
to file a second amended complaint was not filed on December 13,
1993, but was filed with the court on December 14, 1993, at 1:36
p.m., after the hearing before Judge Park.
On December 14, 1993, appellees' counsel prepared a proposed
judgment as ordered by the court.12
On or about December 28, 1993, appellant filed a motion for
reconsideration with points and authorities in support thereof.13

xl

Transcript of proceedings 2-3.

12

Record at 328.

13

Record at 334.
8

In addition, appellant filed the affidavit of attorney and an
affidavit of Lee Bangerter.14
On January 3, 1994, Judge Boyd Park signed the order
granting appellees' motion for summary judgment,15
On January 7, 1994, appellant filed their Opposition to
Motion for Reconsideration; Declaration of Karen Widman; and
Request for Sanctions.16
On January 13, 1994, appellant filed a notice of withdrawal
of appellant's Motion for Reconsideration and filed an additional
motion titled Motion to Set Aside Summary Judgment.17
On January 25, 1994, appellees filed their Opposition to
Motion to Set Aside Summary Judgment; Declaration of Karen
Widman; and Request for Sanctions.18
On or about February 2, 1994, appellant filed her Response
to Defendants' Objection to Plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside
Summary Judgment.19

On February 3, 1994, appellant filed her

Notice of Appeal.20
On February 25, 1994, Judge Park entered his ruling which
denied appellant's motion to set aside summary judgment.21

14

Record at 337 and 339.

15

Record at 342.

16

Record at 381.

17

Record at 437.

18

Record at 482.

19

Record at 493.

20

Record at 494.

21

Record at 497.
9

On March 3, 1994, appellant filed a motion to extend the
filing time for appeal nunc pro tunc.22

This motion was

necessitated because appellant had failed to timely file her
notice of appeal.

Appellee filed an opposition and on March 22,

1994, Judge Park entered a ruling which stated in its findings
and ruling the following:
"1. This case is fraught with untimeliness by the
Plaintiff, resulting in Defendants7 Motion for Rule 11
Sanctions.
....

4. The court signed its Order granting Defendants'
Summary Judgment on January 3, 1994.
5. Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal on February 3,
1994, 31 days after the signing of the court's Summary
Judgment Order. "23
C.

DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT.
Judge Park orally granted appellees' motion for summary

judgment on December 14, 1993.
January 3, 1994.

Judge Park signed the judgment on

The trial court denied appellant's motion to

set aside summary judgment.

Findings of fact are not authorized

with relationship to the granting of a motion for summary
judgment.
The trial court granted appellant's motion nunc pro tunc to
extend the time to file an appeal by one (1) day.
D.

STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Appellant has set forth fourteen (14) facts which are

alleged to be undisputed because appellant asserts that the
statement of facts by the party in opposition to summary judgment
22

Record at 513.

23

Record at 527-528.
10

must be taken as truth.
law.

This is not an accurate statement of

The motion below was a motion for summary judgment.

In

that motion it was established that there were no material issues
of fact in dispute.

Therefore, the only facts which are relevant

are those facts which were demonstrated not to be in dispute and
which entitled appellees to judgment as a matter of law.

As set

forth belowf these are the facts which were not disputed and
which are relevant to the instant appeal.
1.

On March 22, 1991, appellant was employed by LakeCrest

Development Center.24
2.

On March 18, 1992, appellant was immediately and

summarily suspended from her job on the basis of three (3)
complaints of abuse of clients.25
3.

Appellant quit her job on March 23, 1992.26

4.

On or about March 18, 1992, an application was filed on

behalf of Mesa Vista to operate an intermediate care facility for
the mentally retarded (ICF/MR) with the Bureau of Health Facility
Licensure State of Utah.

This application was approved by the

Bureau effective March 25, 1992.27
5.

Mesa Vista took over operation of the facility on April

1, 1992.28
24

Record at 40 f paragraph 9; Record at 228 (Declaration of
Karen Allred).
25

Record at 39, paragraphs 16, 17, 18.

26

Record at 38, paragraph 22 and 23.

27

Record at 188; Record at 229 (Declaration of Karen
Allred).
28

Record at 187 through 188; Record at 229 (Declaration of
Karen Allred).
11

6.

Prior to April lf 1992, Mesa Vista was not the owner,

operator, and had no right of entry into the facility.29
7.

Appellant Sue Ellen Watters was never employed by, nor

an employee of, Mesa Vista, Inc., and never worked for Mesa
Vista, Inc.

Ms. Watters was never on Mesa Vista's payroll and

never received a paycheck from Mesa Vista, Inc.30
8.

Karen A. Allred was never an officer or director of Vali

Division of Wasatch, LakeCrest Developmental Center, or Rocky
Mountain Health Care.

Each of these entities were the managers

or operators of the facility at the time that Sue Ellen Watters
was employed at LakeCrest.31
9.

The court should note that fact number 14 asserted by

appellant is not supported by the record.
suspended on March 23, 1992.

In fact, appellant was

This fact appears from her verified

complaint.32

29

Record at 187 through 188; Record at 229 (Declaration of
Karen Allred).
30

Record at 187 through 188; Record at 228, Paragraph 5
(Declaration of Karen Allred).

31

Record at 187 through 188; Record at 229 and 228.

32

Record at 38, paragraphs 20 through 23.
12

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Summary judgment is appropriate if the trial court finds
that "the pleadings, depositionf answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(c).

As a preliminary

matter, appellant never has alleged that she was employed in any
capacity by Mesa Vista, Inc. or Karen Allred as executive
director of Mesa Vista Inc.

As set forth below, appellant failed

to raise any material issue of fact either through papers in
opposition to appellee's motion for summary judgment or at oral
argument before the trial court.

Thus, it was appropriate for

the trial court to grant summary judgment.
In her brief, appellant asserts that who controlled the
facility raised a material issue of fact to be tried.33
However, appellant concedes that it is undisputed that
appellee, Mesa Vista, was not licensed to operate the facility
until after appellant quit her job.

This admission, along with

the undisputed facts that appellant was never employed by Mesa
Vista, dictates but one result, affirmance of the trial court's
judgment.
The second prong of appellant's attack is as to the trial
court's denial of appellant's motion for relief pursuant to Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60(b).

Appellant moved the court

for relief under Rule 60(b) on the grounds of excusable neglect

33

Brief of Appellant at 11-16.
13

and alleged fraud.34

As will be set forth below, it was not an

abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny appellant's
motion in that an attorney's failure to file an opposition to a
motion for summary judgment and to comply with procedural rules
does not rise to the level of excusable neglect.

The trial court

did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion pursuant to
Rule 60(b).

34

Appellant has abandoned her allegations of fraud. See
Brief of Appellant at 9, note 4.
14

ARGUMENT
I
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY GRANTED IN FAVOR OF APPELLEES
IN THAT APPELLANT WAS NEVER AN EMPLOYEE OF APPELLEE

This case revolves around an alleged wrongful termination of
employment.

The appellees, Mesa Vista, Inc. and Karen A. Allred,

as executive director of Mesa Vista, Inc.f have maintained since
the filing of their motion to dismiss that appellant was never an
employee of Mesa Vista and that Mesa Vista and Karen Allred have
no corporate connection to appellant's employers, Vali Division
of Wasatch, LakeCrest Developmental Center, or Rocky Mountain
Health Care.35

As is fully set forth below, appellant Watters

has consistently conceded that she was never an employee of Mesa
Vista, Inc., never worked for Mesa Vista, Inc., was never paid by
Mesa Vista, Inc. and was never on Mesa Vista, Inc.'s payroll.

In

short, as a matter of law, appellant was never an employee of
Mesa Vista, Inc., and thus has no claim against these appellees.
On appeal herein, appellant still does not claim that she
was ever an employee of Mesa Vista, Inc., but rather argues that
the issue of when Mesa Vista, Inc. took over operation of the
facility is the crucial issue in determining whether or not
summary judgment was properly granted.
From the beginning, appellees Mesa Vista, Inc. and Karen
Allred, as executive director of Mesa Vista, Inc., have
maintained that although appellant may have a colorable claim for
alleged wrongful discharge, such claim must be brought against
35

Karen Allred was employed by Vali Division of
Wasatch/Rocky Mountain Health Care as the Administrator of
the LakeCrest Development Center up to April 1, 1992.
15

parties other than Mesa Vista and Karen Allred as Executive
Director of Mesa Vista.36

In fact, the trial court in granting

the motion for summary judgment stated to appellant that by
granting the motion the way it did "that will leave you free to
bring your lawsuit again against Karen Allred, as acting
administrator and get the proper parties before the court."37
In appellees' request to convert their motion to dismiss
into one for summary judgmentf appellees specifically informed
appellant that "the garvenman of this Motion is that plaintiff
Sue Ellen Watters has sued the wrong parties."38

Appellees set

forth specific facts which appellees claimed were material, and
were not disputed.

The following facts were set forth by

appellees:
"1.

Mesa Vista, Inc. is a Utah Corporation.

2. At the time of Mesa Vista's incorporation, Karen A.
Allred was neither an officer or director of such
corporation. See Declaration of Karen A. Allred at 1,
paragraph 2.
3. On or about March 18, 1992, an application was
filed on behalf of Mesa Vista to operate an
intermediate care facility for the mentally retarded
(ICF/MR) with the Bureau of Heath Facility Licensure
State of Utah. This application was approved by the
Bureau effective March 25, 1992. See Declaration of
Karen A. Allred at 2, paragraph 3.
4. Mesa Vista took over operation of the facility on
April 1, 1992.
5. Prior to April 1, 1992, Mesa Vista was not the
owner, operator, and had no right of entry into the
facility. See Declaration of Karen A. Allred at 2 f
36

This court should note that appellant quit her employment.
She was not fired or otherwise terminated.
37

Hearing transcript at 16:lines 6-8.

38

Record at 190.
16

paragraph 4.
6. Plaintiff Sue Ellen Watters was never employed by,
nor an employee of, Mesa Vista, Inc., and never worked
for Mesa Vista, Inc. Ms. Watters was never on Mesa
Vista's payroll and never received a paycheck from Mesa
Vista, Inc. See Declaration of Karen A. Allred at 3,
paragraph 5.
7. Karen A. Allred was never an officer or director of
Vali Division of Wasatch, LakeCrest Developmental
Center, or Rocky Mountain Health Care. Each of these
entities were the managers or operators of the facility
at the time that Sue Ellen Watters was employed at
LakeCrest. See Declaration of Karen A. Allred at 2,
paragraph 4; and at 3, paragraph 6."39
Each of the above facts were supported by competent
evidence.

For her part, appellant filed no opposition to the

motion for summary judgment.

The declaration filed in opposition

to the motion to dismiss did not address or dispute any of the
material facts set forth by appellee.

Based upon the undisputed

set of facts before Judge Park at the time that he entered
judgment, it is clear that appellant, in fact, sued the wrong
parties.
This case is for wrongful termination of appellant's
employment.

As such, appellant would be required to prove at the

time of trial that appellant, in fact, was employed by Mesa
Vista, Inc.40

It is established in this record, that appellant

was never employed by Mesa Vista, Inc.

To date, appellant has

never tried to deny that she was never an employee of or employed
by Mesa Vista, Inc. in any capacity whatsoever.

The only

evidence in the record from appellant is that she was employed by
39

Record at 187 through 188.

40

See e.g. Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 818 Pac.2d 997
(Utah 1991); see also, Berube v. Fashion Center, Ltd., 771
Pac.2d 1033 (Utah 1989).
17

Rocky Mountain Health Care41 or LakeCrest Development Center42, or
Vali Division of Wasatch43.

Nowhere has appellant attempted to

submit any evidence which demonstrated that she was ever employed
by Mesa Vista, Inc.

Nowhere does appellant attempt to assert

that she was ever an employee of Mesa Vistaf Inc.

In shortf

appellant has never produced any evidence of any nature
whatsoever in this proceeding to support a finding that she was
employed by or an employee of Mesa Vista, Inc.

The only

conclusion that could be reached by the trial court was that
there was no employer-employee relationship between appellant and
appellee and thus the granting of summary judgment on this basis
alone was correct.
II
THERE IS NO TRIABLE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT
REGARDING MESA VISTA'S
LICENSURE

As she did in the trial court below, appellant before this
court contends that there is "manifest confusion" as to what
occurred.44

Appellant asserts that although it is undisputed

that Mesa Vista was not licensed to operate the facility until
the earliest March 25, 199245 there was evidence in the record to

41

See Affidavit of Sue Ellen Watters, Record at 402.

42

Record at 9, paragraph 40.

43

Brief of Appellant at 4.

44

In fact, the basis for appellant's counsels failure to
file an opposition to the motion for summary judgment is
based upon her confessed confusion as to what she is
required to do procedurally. This confusion alibi has been
rejected by the trial court and should be rejected by this
court.
45

Brief of Appellant at 12.
18

show that Mesa Vista was in "actual physical and administrative
control of the facility on March 18, 1992".46

The facts asserted

however, do not rise to the level of creating a genuine issue of
material fact.
Appellee submitted that the following facts were not in
dispute:
"3. On or about March 18, 1992, an application was
filed on behalf of Mesa Vista to operate an
intermediate care facility for the mentally retarded
(ICF/MR) with the Bureau of Heath Facility Licensure
State of Utah. This application was approved by the
Bureau effective March 25, 1992. See Declaration of
Karen A. Allred at 2, paragraph 3.
4. Mesa Vista took over operation of the facility on
April 1, 1992.
5. Prior to April 1, 1992, Mesa Vista was not the
owner, operator, and had no right of entry into the
facility. See Declaration of Karen A. Allred at 2,
paragraph 4."
With regard to the above facts appellant again submitted no
evidence to refute the undisputed facts that Mesa Vista was not
licensed by the Bureau of Health Facility Licensure, State of
Utah, until the earliest March 25, 1992, and that Mesa Vista took
over operation of the facility pursuant to such license on April
1, 1992.

On the other side of the ledger, appellee submitted

the license application47, and the response of the State of Utah
dated March 25, 1992, titled "Notice of Decision-Initial License
Approval".48

With regard to this later document, the license

approval was not mailed until March 30, 1992, thus, the operative

46

Brief of Appellant at 12.

47

See Record at 230, Exhibit 1.

48

Record at 230, Exhibit 2.
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date of April 1, 1992.

Whether the operative date is March 25,

1992f or April lf 1992f is irrelevant in that appellant quit her
job on March 23, 1992.49
As a matter of law, in the State of Utah, Mesa Vista could
not conduct or maintain a health facility without first obtaining
a license.
Based upon the above authority, it is clear that as a matter
of law, Mesa Vista could not conduct business at the facility
until the earliest, March 25, 1992.

Thus, as a matter of law,

the trial court was correct50.
Based upon the fact that appellant was never employed by the
appellees and that the appellees could not, as a matter of law,
conduct business or operate the facility until after being
licensed by the State of Utah, it is respectfully submitted that
the trial court appropriately granted summary judgment in
appellees favor.
Ill
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
APPELLANT'S
MOTION BASED UPON EXCUSABLE

IN
DENYING
NEGLECT

The original motion under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
Rule 60(b), was based upon excusable neglect of the attorney and
alleged fraud.

Through the filing of appellant's brief,

appellant has formerly abandoned any appeal with relationship to
49

Record at 38, paragraph 20-23.

50

Plaintiff's argument that the licensing of Mesa Vista may
be a condition subsequent to the operation of the facility
is nonsense. Mesa Vista's predecessor was required to
continue operating the facility under Utah Administrative
Code section R432-100-2.204(B) and Mesa Vista could not
operate the facility "without first obtaining a license".
Utah Administrative Code section R432-100-2.201(A).
20

the prior allegation of fraud.

In particular, appellant states

that page 19, footnote 4, "Appellant is unwilling to argue this
ground now... ."
Thus this court must review the Rule 60(b) simply for
excusable neglect.

Appellant's Rule 60(b) motion was essentially

based upon appellant's counsels assertion that the reason she
didn't file an opposition to the motion for summary judgment was
that she was "confused" as to what procedural methodology she was
to follow in opposing the summary judgment motion.

Appellant's

counsel also claims that she was unaware of what had occurred.
In particular, appellant's counsel told the trial court
"MS. JONES: I am afraid, Your Honor, that I am
somewhat confused on this issue. We in essence must
have, I frankly probably misinterrupted what counsel
for the plaintiff or for the defendants were attempting
to do. I have no objection to the Motion to Convert to
a Summary Judgment, but I would, was unaware that there
was additional evidence or objection necessary to the
summary judgment a part from our Objections to their
Motion to Dismiss. I think that the facts are there in
the record. "51
Rule 60(b) provides that a court may relieve a party from a
final judgment or order if there is excusable neglect.

In the

instance case, the alleged neglect is appellant's counsels
failure to file affidavits or other evidence in opposition to
appellees' motion for summary judgment.

The "excuse" for this

neglect is appellant's counsels feigned confusion as to what to
do.
Appellant's counsel was aware from the beginning of what was
occurring with relationship to the instant motion for summary
judgment.

On November 5, 1993, the trial court entered an order

51

Transcript at 5, line 25 through 6: line 8.
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setting "defendant's motion to dismiss, now converted to motion
for summary judgment" for hearing.52

On September 30, 1993f

appellant's counsel filed a Request for Oral Argument on
appellees' "Motion for Summary Judgment".53

In short,

appellant's counsel knew that the proceeding was one for summary
judgment.
Appellant's counsel knew that under Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rule 12(b), the filing of "matters outside the
pleading" in support of a motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6),
converted the motion to "one for summary judgment" which was to
be disposed of as provided in Rule 56".

Appellant's counsel is

also aware that she was to be given "reasonable opportunity to
present all materials made pertinent to such a motion by Rule
56".

Pursuant to Rule 56(c) and (e), the proceedings on a motion

for summary judgment are set forth with particularity.
Appellant's counsel is aware of this rule.
Up to this point, appellant's counsel has failed in all
respects to explain how her confusion over what was happening
could rise to the level of excusable neglect.

In short, the

trial court did not abuse its discretion.
Further, what appellant's counsel attempts to do is to
submit new evidence not presented to the trial court at the time
of hearing the motion for summary judgment.

Rule 60(b) is quite

explicit in this regard when it states that a motion to be
relieved from an order may be granted based upon "newly

"Record at 315.
53

Record at 238.
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discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been
discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b)".

If

appellant is asserting this a as basis for submitting new
evidence, it is clear that appellant's counsel has never claimed
that this evidence could not have been introduced prior to the
hearing on the motion for summary judgment.

Further, pursuant to

Rule 56, if there are affidavits which could be solicited but
were not available at the time of the filing of the motion, there
is a procedure for appellant to request the trial court to give
her an opportunity to gather such affidavits.

This was not done.

Based upon the foregoing, it is clear that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's counsels
motion pursuant to Rule 60(b).

23

CONCLUSION

Appellant's suit was brought against Mesa Vista, Inc. and
Karen Allred as executive director of Mesa Vistaf Inc.
Appellees' motion to dismiss which was converted to one for
summary judgment was essentially brought because appellant had
sued the wrong party.

In particular, during the period of time

that appellant was employed, she was employed by LakeCrest
Developmental Center and/or Vali Division of Wasatchf and/or
Rocky Mountain Health Care.

These appellees have no connection

to these entities.
It is conclusively established in this record that appellant
was employed by someone other than Mesa Vista, Inc.

It is

undisputed by appellant that Mesa Vista, Inc. and Karen Allred as
executive director of Mesa Vista, have no connection to Vali
Division of Wasatch, Rocky Mountain Health Care or LakeCrest
Developmental Center.

It is also established in this record that

on March 18, 1992, appellant was suspended from her job without
pay.

It is also undisputed that on March 23, 1992, appellant

terminated her employment by quitting.
Finally, it is undisputed that the State of Utah, Bureau of
Health Facility Licensure, issued an operator's license to Mesa
Vista authorizing Mesa Vista to operate the intermediate care
facility for the mentally retarded.
Based upon the above facts it is clear that appellant was
never employed by nor an employee of Mesa Vista, Inc.

Appellant

did not submit any evidence to the trial court or to this court
which would dispute this fact.

It is clear that as a matter of

law, Mesa Vista, Inc. could not have been operating the facility
24

until licensed to do so by the State of Utah.

It is undisputed

by the parties that this authority from the State of Utah was
provided at the earliest on March 25, 1992, after appellant quit
her employment with LakeCrest Development Center.

It is equally

clear that Vali Division of Wasatch dba LakeCrest Developmental
Center, as the licensed operator of the facility is the proper
party to sue.54
Dated: 12-2-94

BLATTER AND FIELDING
Ron Fielding
LAW OFFICES OF DAVID M. SHELL
David M. Shell
Jeanine K. Clasen

y

By:

David M. Shell
Attorney for Defendants and
Appellees

54

In fact, appellant has filed suit against Vali Division of
Wasatch. See Watters vs. Allred, et al. Case No. 930400658
filed on December 14, 1993.
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THE COURT:

This is the time set for Oral Argument in the

matter of'Sue Ellen Watters the Plaintiff vs. Karen All red and Mesa Verde
Inc.
Two motions are before the court.

We have Defendants' Motion to

Dismiss, now converted to a Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiff's
Motion for filing a second amended complaint.
MS. JONES:

Your Honor, that motion has been withdrawn.

It

was withdrawn yesterday . J have got copies here, Your Honor.

?

THE COURT:
MS. JONES:

It has been withdrawn?
Yes.

J was not aware of local counsel or I would

have served them yesterday.
In light of their response, J have determined that
probably some procedure irregularities.
possibility

there is

Furthermore, there is a strong

that we may need to file an additional amended complaint as

per some of their objections.

It just would make more sense, at this

point to me, to withdraw that and hold that with the view to possibly
making some amendments after the

order of dismissal

or after ihe

discussion today.

not

THE COURT:

Have you filed a document?

MS. JONES:

We filed a notice of withdrawal with that motion.

THE COURT:

When did you file that?

MS. JONES:

Yesterday.

THE COURT:

All right.

aware of it.

Judgment.

It hasn't hit the file so I am

All we have in front of us is a Motion for Summary

It is defendants' motion and counsel we have, Mr. Shell are

you here?
MR. SHELL:
who is local counsel.

Yes, Your Honor.

Also with me is Mr. Blatter

We filed an association of attorneys yesterday for

Mr. Blotter.
THE COURT:

That is not in the file either.

I think I mentione)

it that you need to have some counsel here.
MR. SHELL:

May I approach the bailiff, Your Honor?

THE COURT:

Yes, you may.

3

MR. SHELL:

The conformed copy of the association that was

f i led yesterday.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. SHELL:

My presentation w i l l be b r i e f f o r two reasons,

Your Honor.

You may proceed Mr. S h e l l .

F i r s t I believe our papers sets out the essential

facts which i f uncontested would require t h a t Summary Judgment be granted
as to the defendants, we f i l e d a summary judgment motion as t o .

What

] would l i k e to do i s proceed and - THE COURT:

Why don't you come up ^ere to the l e c t e r n .

MR. SHELL:

Okay.

THE COURT:

Or do you need all those documents that you have

got scattered out there.
MR. SHELL:

If I need something in addition, Your Honor, I will

go back and get it.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. SHELL:

As the court will recall, initially it was a Motion

to Dismiss on the original complaint that was filed . It was
in opposition to that motion, thit the plaintiff filed
evidence.

significant

Then pursuant to the rules that govern this motion, we

requested that it be converted to a Motion for Summary Judgment.
filed with the court a document

We

styled our response to their

objections and then our request to convert to Summary Judgment which at
Page 3, after we had made the request to convert , we begain with our
statement of undisputed facts.
We submitted a memorandum

in support of that motion.

We submitted

4

1

to the court the Declaration of Karen A. All red

2

additional evidence for the court to consider.

3

which contained

The reason I bring this to the court's attention is that we have

4

received in the mails and I have checked with the clerk downstairs, there

5

has not been filed any opposition to our Motion to convert to Summary

6

Judgment or to the Motion for Summary Judgment itself.

7

THE COURT:

I didn't find one either.

8

MR. SHELL:

i read the Code of Judicial Administration Rule

9

relating to Summary Judgment and I have read the Utah Rules of Civil

10

Procedure, and they all indicate

11

this one is, that it must be granted.

12

that if a motion is unopposed, as

Even taking the worst case scenario

for our client that you could

13

consider the opposition to the Motion to Dismiss

14

Summary Judgment, there is no evidence presented in there, at all,

15

concerning the undisputed facts regarding

16

which are set forth beginning at Page 3 of our reply and our Motion to

17

Convert.

18

as an opposition to

Mesa Vista, Karen Allred

I would submit, Your Honor, t h a i based upon the evidence that we

19

have presented and the undisputed facts which are undisputed, t h a t

20

there is only one course and t h a t is that the court grant the Motion

21

f o r Summary Judgment.

22

since I have no opposition to the motion

23

disputed facts that the p l a i n t i f f may c l a i m .

On t h a t , I don't have anything else I can say
so I c a n ' t respond to any

24

THE COURT:

Ms. Jones.

25

MS. JONES:

I am a f r a i d , Your Honor, t h a t I am somewhat

1

confused on this issue.

We in essence must have, I frankly

2

probably misinterpreted what counsel for the plaintiff

3

defendants were attempting to do.

or for the

4

I have no objection to the Motion to Convert to a Summary

5

Judgment, but I would, was unaware thai there was additional

6

evidence or objection necessary to the Summary Judgment a part from our

7

objections to their Motion to Dismiss.

8

i n the record.

9

I think that the facts are there

Contrary to what counsel for the defendants' has argued, there is

10

specific disputed evidence in the record

11

Paragraph 4 on Page 4.

12

of this on April the 1st of 1992.

13

agreement that they signed is undated but it is signed.

14

March date. I have

15

or 18th of March.

16

23rd between in a period between the 18th and the 23rd of March.

17

as to Points

4 on their page,

They argue that Mesa Vista took over the operatiorj

inclination

The particular

specific sublease and
It is a

that was signed on or around the 17th

My client's cause of action arose on or around the

They argue in Paragraph 5

that prior to April the 1st of 1992 that

18

Mesa Vista was not the owner/operator and had no right of entry on the

19

facility.

20

There again, we would dispute that.

21

operation.

22

best of my available knowledge.

23

parties.

24
25

This was a turnkey

The paperwork was signed on March the 17th or 18th to the
On that basis, these were the responsibly

In any case, the sublease the terms of the agreement
Your Homr,

sets forth

an acceptance of responsibility

and sublease,
for all pending

6

and threatened litigation and future responsibility for all debts of
Lakecrest or the prior owners and operators of the facility which
even given the dispute over the dates means that the defendants Mesa
Vista Inc., has accepted a specific right

of responsibility to

all

creditors under that agreement.
As per Paragraph No. 7 and their argument that
misplaced.

Ms. Allred, at all times, from

Ms. Allred is

sometime prior to October

or November,as I recall of 1991, was the acting administrator both of
Lakecrest

and of Mesa Vista. She was also one of the main principal

parties involved in the proposal to purchase from
of Wasatch or sublease from

Vali

vali

Division

Division of Wasatch, however, you

want to term that contract , as to make the arrangements and take over th£
responsibility in terms of Mesa Vista.
At all times, she was acting as the administrator.
specific actions against my client>regardl ess of what
legal authority

It is her
corporate or

was behind her, that one of the actions

ensued in this

matter.
The standard in any case for a Motion for Summary Judgment is that
there is no possible view of the facts that can support a judgment
for my client .

I do not think that scandard is met in any case in this

matter.
I think that given there is a possibility
beneficiary and as the direct responsible party
Vista, there

is no question

executive and administrator of

both as a third party
in terms of Mesa

that Ms. Allred was the administrator, chiejf
the facility during

all the period in

7

question.

Therefore,

I think their Motion

for Summary Judgment

should be denied at this point.
THE COURT:

What evidence do you have with regard to

your

allegations that the defendant Mesa Vista actually took over under a
sublease in March of 1992?
MS. JONES:

The sublease in our motion our opposition to their

Motion to Dismiss, Your Honor, I think it is attached at

"B" in the

back the specific liability.
In addition, under the terms of that sublease, Ms. Allred and this
is also attached to appendix "B'\

Ms. Allred applied for agency action

beginning on March the 18th of 1992.
THE COURT:

Tell me where it is you are making reference to

and you are in Exhibit

"B"?

MS. JONES:

Exhibit r'B".

THE COURT:

I have got Exhibit "B n .

MS. JONES:

It is Exhibit

THE COURT:

Agreement of sublease?

MS. JONES:

Yes and then behind that

What part of Exhibit "B"?

n ,!

B , Appendix "B,:, Exhibit No. 7.

is the next document

in that file is request for agency action, licensed application of Ms.
Allred.

That application was

filed under the terms of this contract

and was condition subsequent an inability to obtain that contract, Your
Honor, or that approval

, licensing approval was not a condition

precedent to the sublease agreement.

It was a condition subsequent.

It would have resulted , the inability would have resulted in default,
but as it was a

turnkey operation, the agreement in sublease essentially

8

turned over a l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and l i a b i l i t y to tne company, Mesa V i s t a .
I would c a l l , Your Honor's a t t e n t i o n s p e c i f i c a l l y to Paragraph 3,^ - THE COURT : Are you t a l k i n g about the agreement
MS. JONES:

Yes,the agreement i n sublease.

i n sublease.

Paragraph 8

indicates that o b t a i n i n g l i c e n s i n g was a condition subsequently t h a t
would nave resulted i n d e f a u l t under the agreement but i t was not a
c o n d i t i o n precedent to the sublease

while

arrangement.

THE COURT:

Anything f u r t h e r ?

MS. JONES:

What?

THE COURT:

Anything further?

MS. JONES:

Your Honor, it is the plaintiff's position tnat

tne defendants' arguments may necessitate an amendment as I stated

before adding

Vali

Division of Wasatch as a party, that there

are sufficient grounds, in this sublease
questions

as specifically

arrangement, okay, and the

one when they took over.Their argument was

April the 1st. I think that is a factual issue that requires more then
a statement in support.

This contract although undated has a March

date on it. Jt is our position that
17th or 18th of March

was signed on or around the

which would make them specifically liable

for action taken against my client.
In any case, this is a technical dispute that should better be
remedied with an amendment rather than Summary Judgment, the granting
of Summary Judgment on their behalf at this point.

Thank you.

THE COURT:

Mr. Shell .

MR. SHELL:

Thank you, Your Honor. Again with the agreement

9

in sublease, Your Honor, the State of Utah
to be licensed by the State of Utah .

That sublease agreement doesn't

authorize my client to operate an ICFMR.
licensure can do that.

to operate an ICFMR you have

Only the state through

There is no dispute, by the plaintiff, as to the

facts relating to licensure.

That the license was not received until

the 30th of March and Mesa Vista took over
Vali

April the 1st.

Division of Wasatch and Mesa Vista

we don't need to be licensed.

could not agree that

The state requires such licensure.

The second thing that I would like to point out about the
terms of that subleasing agreement.
relying on

If the paragraph that they are

our client taking over liabilities,

rely on for liability, they need to sue
indemnification from us.

is what they want to

Vali • Then

Vali

can seek

That does not create a right of action

in Sue Ellen Watters against my client.
I also have responded to that specific- THE COURT:

Is your client Mesa Vista?

MR. SHELL:

Yes, Your Honor.

That creates a cause of action

maybe Valley against us if they get sued.

Again the whole thrust of

our motion is they sued the wrong people.
There is a letter in there from a Dr. Cady which the plaintiffs have
given to the court.
claim is against
admission.

Sue Watters said that my

Rocky Mountain Health Care.

That is their exhibit.

Rocky Mountain
reason.

Dr. Cady says that well

They ^now that they should have sued

and they should have sued Vali

We don't know

Now that is a party

> but they didn't for som£

why they were testing the case on that basis.

10

1

The standard t h a t was announced f o r Summary Judgment is not

2

by the p l a i n t i f f .

3

i n dispute and are we e n t i t l e d to judgment as a matter

4

material issues of f a c t are not in d i s p u t e .

5

that

The standard i s , i s there a material issue of f a c t
of law. The

The court can review what we have submitted to the c o u r t .
about licensure

There is no

6

question

and when we were licensed we have given t h a t tc|

7

the c o u r t . There is no question that Sue Ellen Watte^s was never an

8

employee of Mesa V i s t a .

9

have raised and put i t i n our declaration and they d i d n ' t dispute t h a t .

That is a material issue of fact

t h a t we

10

They don't dispute t h a t she has never , the p l a i n t i f f , w a s never an

11

employee of Mesa V i s t a .

12

that she never received a paycheck, even a separation paycheck from Mesa

13

Vista.

14

Mountaiii , not Mesa V i s t a .

15
16

That i s very t e l l i n g .

A l l of that was done w i t h

They don't dispute

Val i and Lakecrest and Rocky

They don't dispute any of t h a t .

Now i f I could go to t h a t one paragraph on the terms of the
sublease dealing w i t h us taking over the l i a b i l i t i e s .

17 j f o r the court the language
18

over

19

pending or threatened l i t i g a t i o n .

20

of 1992, t h i s case was not pending.

21

every and a l l

that is e s s e n t i a l .

liabilities.

We have quoted

We never agreed to take

This is a case, we agreed to take over
When we took over on A p r i l the 1st
This case was not threatened.

I would submit t h a t even i f the court wanted to f i n d that maybe

22

w

23

would not cover us.

24

or A p r i l of 1993, long a f t e r that agreement became e f f e c t i v e .

25

w o u l d n ' t , even on the

e should stay i n the case f o r the purposes of whatever, t h a t language
This case, J d o n ' t b e l i e v e , was f i l e d u n t i l March

face

0f

it

So we

, we c o u l d n ' t be covered by t h a t .

11

I would submit, Your Honor, that there is no amendment that car. cure
this.

That if she wanted to object to the Motion for Summary

Judgment, she had a procedural remedy set out in the various rules which
was to tell us her legal and factual basis for disputing it.

She hasn't

done that, and she hasn't done it again today.
I would submit that the motion needs to be granted.
THE COURT:
associated with

Is Karen All red

Val i , Lakecrest or Rocky Mountain in any fashion?

MR. SHELL:
ever was

Let me ask you a question.

No, Your Honor.

, was an employee of

Val i

In fact, the most that she
Division of Wasatch.

it is difficult to determine who she was employed by.

Actually,

I believe she

was employed by Lakecrest Developmental Center which was operated by
Rocky Mountain Health Care which in turn was owned by
of Wasatch.

Vali

She was never anything other than an employee.

that is in her declaration.

Division
In fact

Mesa Vista has never been affiliated in

anyway, shape or form with any of those other three organizations.

hired

THE COURT:

What was

her position as an employee with

MR. SHELL:

I believe in October the 1st of 1991, she was

as the acting administrator.

She operated as the

up through and including March 30th of 1992.
1992, she was employed as the administrator
THE COURT:
Vali

Well, basically she was

Vali?

administrator

Beginning April the 1st of
for Mesa Vista Inc.
the administrator for

acting or otherwise?
MR. SHELL:

Correct.

Theory would just make Vali

But her acts then on a Respondeat

Superi

liable for whatever actions she took but

12

not Mesa Vista.
Then again, Your Honor,
the court.

the wrong parties have been brought before

Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT:

Ms. Jones.

MS. JONES:

I think there is an affidavit also in that attachment

"B" , Your Honor.

Counsel for the defendants have argued

not pending or threatened litigation.

that this was

I think that negotiations

between our offices and the office of local counsel here, Mr. Blatter
in early April, very shortly after my client was terminated.
THE COURT:

Well, by April the 1st that is when they apparently]

MS. JONES:

It was after April 1st that such negotiation began

THE COURT:

It would seem it wasn't pending or threatened.

MS. JONES:

It depends on when the cause of action arose.

took over.

the cause of action arose, it seems to me on

If

between the 18th and 23rd

of March than then it would become threatened or pending litigation
once that cause of action arose.
THE COURT:

I think when we talk "pending" or "threatened"

we are talking about what is pending or tnreatened as of the date
of the agreement.

There has to be actual knowledge of that not something|

that comes down the road later. Just that language alone, you nave
to nave actual knowledge otherwise you have
all to a contract.

If it is not pending or

nr

> meeting of the mind at
threatening on April the

1st, then I don't see how Mesa Vista could be a part of this lawsuit.
MS. JONES:

Okay.

13

THE COURT:
I am not n e c e s s a r i l y

My concern i s about Karen A l l r e d .

However,

i n c l i n e d t o g r a n t a Summary Judgment a g a i n s t

Karen A l l r e d .
MS. JONES:

Your Honor, i f you want t o g r a n t a g a i n s t

her

a dismissal- THE COURT:

Pardon.

MS. JONES:

I f you want t o g r a n t a g a i n s t her

dismissal
against

and i f
Vali

they w i l l

accept s e r v i c e ,

J will

a voluntary

amend our c o m p l a i n t

D i v i s i o n o f Wasatch.

THE COURT

D o n ' t know i f they r e p r e s e n t

Vali?

MS. JONES

They w o n ' t but they r e p r e s e n t

Karen.

MR. SHELL

We w i l l

MS. JONES

Tne question is w i l l you accept service of the s u i t

MR. SHELL

She i s dismissed.

accept a v o l u n t a r y

dismissal.

Maybe I am misunderstanding,

Your Honor.
MS. JONES:

Never mind.

I won't do t h a t .

THE COURT: W e l l , ] want to get your arguments with regard
to Karen A l l r e d why
Karen A l l r e d .

I should grant a Motion f o r Summary Judgment as to

S p e c i f i c a l l y , I think i t i s f a i r l y c l e a r

and I w i l l

grant

the Motion f o r Summary Judgment against Mesa Vista I n c .
As to Karen A l l r e d , you have e n t i t l e d your complaint or amended
complaint

Karen A l l r e d Executive D i r e c t o r .

I f your p o s i t i o n is

that

we are suing Karen A l l r e d as Executive Director o f Mesa Vista then I
suspect that I should grant the Motion f o r Summary Judgment.

However,

I wouldn't want this Motion f o r Summary Judgment to be argued that you do
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not have a cause of action against Karen Allred, the acting administrator
of
you

Vali , if that happens to be another lawsuit you want to file.

If

think that you served Karen All red as Executive Director of Mesa

Vista,then I should probably grant the Motion for Summary Judgment - MS. JONES:

We have served her personally, Your Honor.

THE COURT: - - against all parties.
MS. JONES:

We have served her in person and not specifically

in her capacity as Executive Director.
THE

COURT:

Well, I am just looking at the heading of

amended complaint, you just list her as Executive Director.
and look at your amended complaint

your

Go back

and see whether or not you mentioned

that you served her personally.
MR. SHELL: I believe the court is correct.

She was served

in her capacity, well she was sued in her capacity as Executive
Director and Administrator of Mesa Vista.
THE COURT:

Well, in looking at Paragraphs 12 and 13

ownership of Lakecrest Center including
transferred to Karen All red.

the

the Rehabilitation Center was

I assume that is totally inaccurate?

MR. SHELL:

I am sorry, Your Honor, which one are you looking

THE COURT:

I am just looking at her amended complaint ,

at?

at Ms. Jones' amended complaint Paragraph 12

says that in February

of 1992 the ownership of Lakecrest Center including the Rehabilitation
Center.
MS. JONES:

Your Honor, 1 think that is probably a misstatement!

15

of the actual legal f a c t s .

I do not think i t is a misstatement of the

facts as represented e i t h e r by Ms. A l l r e d i n

her numerous c a p a c i t i e s .

Legally she was not.
THE COURT:

What I am going to do.

the Motion f o r Summary Judgment against

I am going to grant

Mesa Vista .and as against

Karen A l l r e d as Executive D i r e c t o r of Mesa Vista and that w i l l
free to bring your lawsuit

leave you

again against Karen A l l r e d as'an acting

administrator and get the proper parties before the c o u r t .
MS. JONES:

Okay.

MR. SHELL:

Thank you, Your Honor.

Would you like me to

prepare the order for the court?
THE COURT: Pardon me.
MR. SHELL:

Would you like me to prepare the order for the

THE COURT:

Yes, please and submit it to Ms. Jones for

court?

approval as to form before you submit it to the court for
MR. SHELL:

Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

Okay.

Thank you.

signature.

If nothing further court will be

in recess.
THE BAILIFF:

Everyone please arise.

Court will be in recess.

(WHEREUPON, this matter was concluded)
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2
3
4
5

I STATE OF UTAH

)

6

| COUNTY OF WASATCH )

ss.

7
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11 I

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the HEARING was reported by me in

12

Stenotype, and thereafter caused by me to be transcribed into

13

typewriting by Richard C. Tatton and that a full, true and correct

14

transcription of said HEARING was so taken.

15

J FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not of kin or otherwise

16

associated with any of the parties to said cause of action and that

17

j am not interested in the event thereof.

18 I
19

WITNESS my hand and official eal at Midway, Utah, this

| rl %

day of February, 1994.

20
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24
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